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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Governments worldwide have been increasingly looking to the private sector to fill the 
growing gap between the demand and supply of infrastructure services. As a result, 
private participation in infrastructure (PPI) in developing countries increased 
dramatically in the past fifteen years, accounting for more than $850 billion in committed 
new investment between 1990 and 2005.1 While the results have been mixed in some 
countries, many governments have recognized that the private sector can be an important 
mechanism for bringing technical and managerial expertise to the construction, operation, 
maintenance, and financing of infrastructure projects. 
 
This paper looks at specific type of PPI projects called “unsolicited proposals.” 
Unsolicited proposals are not requested by a government and usually originate within the 
private sector. These proposals typically come from companies with ties to a particular 
industry—such as developers, suppliers, and financiers—that spend their own money to 
develop basic project specifications, then directly approach governments to get the 
required official approvals. 
 
This paper focuses on unsolicited proposals that are natural monopolies or are in markets 
with limited or no competition (for example, water distribution concessions, toll roads, 
airports, and such), as opposed to projects that must compete within markets once 
licensed (for example, merchant power plants, cellular telecom service, and so on). PPI 
projects in deregulated, competitive markets generally do not require as much public 
sector support or oversight, and costumers have the option to turn to alternatives if a 
service is overpriced or quality is not satisfactory.  
 
A major issue is that many unsolicited projects are associated with a lack of competition 
and transparency. Much of the controversy stems from governments granting exclusive 
development rights to private proponents without a transparent tendering process. Private 
proponents commonly argue they have intellectual property rights to project concepts, are 
the only developer interested in the project, or can save the government time and money 
by sole-source negotiating project details. Unfortunately, governments are often too 
easily convinced by these arguments and, as a result of being sole-sourced, the 
unsolicited proposals lend themselves more easily to corruption.   
 
Another major issue is the increasing numbers of unsolicited proposals presented to 
governments in both developing and developed countries. While in many cases the origin 
of a project is not clear, the percentage of overall PPI projects that originate as unsolicited 
proposals is also estimated to be significant in some countries (for example, 
approximately 43 percent in Taiwan [China]). Because unsolicited proposals are 
beginning to represent a significant share of overall projects in many countries and these 
proposals can create negative public perceptions, many policy makers have begun to 
realize the need to directly address them in PPI legislation. 
 
                                                 
1 See PPI Database, World Bank, http://ppi.worldbank.org/. 
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Unsolicited proposals increase the burden on governments and corresponding perceptions 
of corruption, which leads to arguments to prohibit them altogether. For example, 
governments can better organize overall sector development by initiating all projects 
themselves and can establish public sector “buy-in” for future governments. At a 
minimum, a principle should be that all unsolicited proposals are channeled into a 
transparent, competitive process where challengers have a fair chance of winning the 
tender. 
 
The premise of this paper is that some unsolicited proposals, when subject to competition 
and transparency, may contribute to the overall infrastructure goals of countries, 
particularly where governments have low technical and financial capacity to develop 
projects themselves. Based on this premise, a few governments have developed effective 
systems to channel unsolicited proposals into public competitive processes, thus 
providing more transparency and political legitimacy to private infrastructure.  
 
In particular, this paper looks at the processes of Chile, the Republic of Korea, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Taiwan (China) in detail, as these governments have 
created institutional mechanisms that encourage the private sector to come forward with 
potentially beneficial project concepts, while at the same time introducing competitive 
forces to secure the benefits associated with a public tender. Other countries, such as 
Argentina and Costa Rica, have also recently developed similar policies for managing 
unsolicited proposals; it is expected that more countries will follow these models.  
 
The most common systems that governments use to manage unsolicited proposals are 
commonly referred to as the “bonus system,” the “Swiss challenge system,” and the “best 
and final offer system.” Using a bonus system, the governments of Chile and Korea grant 
an advantage to the original project proponent in the form of a premium used in the 
bidding procedure. The “bonus,” usually between 5 percent and 10 percent, is credited to 
the original proponent’s bid in the open tender. The Swiss Challenge System—used in 
the Indian States of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, Italy, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the 
U.S. territory of Guam—also allows third parties to compete. However, the original 
proponent is granted the right to counter-match the best offer and secure the contract. The 
best and final offer system—used in Argentina and South Africa—is similar to the Swiss 
challenge in approach, but only grants the original proponent the advantage of 
automatically competing in the final tendering round.   
 
The conclusions of the paper draw on the experiences of several countries. In practice, all 
the main systems have demonstrated to be effective in providing more transparency and 
competition to private infrastructure projects, and are much better than having no policy 
at all. However, they are only as successful as the overall PPI systems and institutions of 
the country where they operate. Unsolicited proposal systems are not a substitute for 
overall PPI governance and planning. Other major PPI policy issues must be addressed 
before even allowing unsolicited proposals to be considered and implementing any 
unsolicited proposal policy.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BOT build-operate-and-transfer 
BROT build-rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer 
IRR implementing rules and regulations 
LGU local government unit 
PPI private participation in infrastructure 
PPP public-private partnership 
PSC public sector comparator 
PSP private sector participation 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
VfM value for money  
 
Unless otherwise noted, all monetary denominations are U.S. dollars. 
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PRIVATE SECTOR MOTIVATIONS 
 
The general public tends to view unsolicited projects as serving special interests or 
tainted with corruption. The controversial issues associated with unsolicited proposals do 
not stem from the project concept originating in the private sector, rather they stem from 
the project being exclusively negotiated with the original private sector proponent 
without sufficient transparency or competition.  
 
These two features, a lack of competition and a lack of transparency, are characteristic of 
many unsolicited proposals. Figure 1.1 illustrates the possible origins of projects as well 
as the benefits generally associated with government-initiated projects and competitive 
tenders.  
 
Figure 1.1: Benefits of Proposals by Procurement Method 
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Source: Authors. 
 
Private proponents often propose projects with the specific objective of avoiding a 
competitive process to determine the project developer. If successful in obtaining 
exclusivity for a particular project, the private proponent then usually directly negotiates 
the project details with the government behind closed doors, with, of course, as favorable 
terms as possible.  
 
More specifically, some private proponents claim that special circumstances dictate the 
necessity to sole-source some project proposals, such as the following reasons: 
 
• A project developer possesses intellectual property rights to key approaches or 
technologies;  
• A lack of private-sector interest due to the small scale, remote location, or 
political risk of the project; 
• Organizing a public tender may not be cost efficient for governments, bidders, or 
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both; 
• The speed of project development would be more rapid through negotiations, 
especially during emergencies or widespread shortages. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Many companies propose unsolicited projects claiming to use new techniques or 
technologies that cannot be sourced elsewhere, such as special engineering knowledge 
used to construct more durable roads, provide cleaner water, and so forth. The 
government, therefore, would be violating the proprietary rights of the proponent by 
exposing their techniques in a competitive process. The procurement laws of several 
countries authorize exclusive negotiation if a superior type of good or service is only 
available from a particular supplier or if no alternative exists.2  
 
However, often substitutes or equivalent technologies of similar quality are available to 
complete the project, even though original proponents may claim that they are not. When 
seeking alternatives, governments can define a selection process that emphasizes the 
expected output of the project without stating a particular technology that must be used 
(see appendix B for the example in Victoria, Australia). Each bidder is then able to 
propose its own process or method, which is compared to the unsolicited proposal; the 
original proponent’s proprietary rights remain secure.3 In addition, if the original 
proponent’s specific proprietary techniques are required, but the original proponent is not 
the desired party to develop or operate the project for other reasons, then it is still 
possible to set up a licensing arrangement for only the specific proprietary techniques. 
 
Proprietary rights to techniques or engineering technologies should not be confused with 
the intellectual property rights of the project itself. Many countries acknowledge 
intellectual property rights over the project idea and recognize this in the tendering 
process. In Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Korea, for example, the project 
development costs are usually included in the tender documents as an expense to be paid 
to the original project developer. 
 
Lack of Private Sector Interest 
 
Another common reason for allowing unsolicited proposals to be negotiated on an 
exclusive basis is the belief that the characteristics of the project will not attract sufficient 
bidders. Many unsolicited proposals are targeted at remote areas where competition for 
the market is limited. In these smaller municipalities, proponents argue that a competition 
is not necessary because no other developers and operators are interested.  
 
To address insufficient interest, governments may be able to use innovative methods to 
make the project more attractive. Options to draw in other potential bidders include 
                                                 
2 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Legislative Guide on Privately Financed 
Infrastructure Projects (2001), 93, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/pfip/guide/pfip-e.pdf. 
3 See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (2001), 92, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/pfip/guide/pfip-e.pdf. 
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pooling together smaller concessions (for example, French Water Concessions),4 offering 
some form of additional government contribution based on performance, or including 
other services in the tender (such as pooling water and electricity services).   
 
Even with only one bidder, staging a tender process may still provide benefits. Awarding 
projects to unsolicited proponents without competitive bidding often creates public 
doubts of the project’s legitimacy because corruption can be concealed more easily when 
the awarding process is not sufficiently transparent. In some cases, corruption might not 
even exist, but the lack of transparency will render projects vulnerable to accusations by 
political opponents. An open tender, even with only the original proponent, might at least 
evidence a government’s commitment to transparency and process, as well as 
demonstrate that there was only one interested bidder, which otherwise might only have 
been speculation.  
 
Cost Efficiency  
 
Private proponents argue that governments can avoid unnecessary expenses by skipping a 
tendering process when they are confident the original proponent will win anyway or 
their will not be any other proposals. Directly negotiating unsolicited proposals 
theoretically could help save the government money. But the cost implications of putting 
together a quick tender process (for example, failing to consider risks) might outweigh, in 
the long run, the cost benefits of rapid project procurement, especially if the project is 
going to be given in concession for several decades.   
 
Through a competitive bidding process, a government will be able to define sector 
development objectives and other standards (such as environmental and regulatory) by 
establishing conditions in the tender documents for the long term. With negotiated 
unsolicited proposals, private proponents will use their negotiation talents to establish 
criteria without regard for the long-term strategy of the government. As a consequence, 
the exclusively negotiated unsolicited project might actually lead to long-term 
bottlenecks in overall infrastructure development, especially in the case of network 
infrastructure. 
 
Hidden costs are another major issue. Contingent liabilities often become part of sole-
source negotiated, unsolicited proposal agreements. In Malaysia, for example, the 
government signed a build-rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer (BROT) concession 
agreement for improvements to Kuala Lumpur’s sewerage system, with subsequent 
expansion to the national system. In order to get the project finalized, the government 
also gave soft loans totaling almost $200 million and a guaranteed post-tax return to the 
investors.5 
 
The government has potential financial benefits with a competitive process even if the 
original proponent wins with the original conditions. For example, if other bidders 
                                                 
4 Michael Klein, “Infrastructure Concessions—To Auction or Not to Auction?” Public Policy for the Private Sector 
159 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998): 2, 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PublicPolicyJournal/159klein.pdf. 
5Berhad, “Discount for Three Years,” Business Times Malaysia, August 4, 1995. 
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participate, then the government will have more leverage because it has a fallback option 
if the original proponent is unable to reach financial closure, complete the project, or 
violates the agreed terms.6 The original proponent will also be less likely to begin the 
project then demand a higher tariff or longer concession period due to cost overruns, 
which is common. 
 
As for other potential bidders, many will not want to risk money on bid preparation when 
the private proponent has already invested considerable time and effort. One option is to 
have the public share the bidding costs upfront. Project development costs of the 
unsolicited project proponent will most likely be passed on to the consumers indirectly in 
any case, because costs are often included as a project development expense. Another 
option is to also offer reimbursement of proposal development costs, at least to the 
second best evaluated offer. 
 
Speed of Project Development 
 
Under special conditions, governments justify some directly negotiated unsolicited 
proposals as fulfilling urgent requirements. However, the experiences of several countries 
have shown that sole-source negotiations usually take much more time than originally 
expected and often end up delaying the project by several years.  
 
In Indonesia, for example, many unsolicited proposals have taken several years to 
negotiate, often not resulting in financial closure because final agreements could not be 
reached. The Bangkok Elevated Road and Train System (BERTS) in Thailand and the 
Dabhol Power Plant in India were each continually negotiated for almost a decade 
because the projects were cancelled and then restructured under new governments.   
 
Additionally, while it is true that initial design and implementation of a well-organized 
competitive bidding process may require some time to develop, the experiences of 
several countries have shown that once the process is systematized, future projects may 
be moved through the system more quickly and with more efficiency. Perspective bidders 
will also understand the systems better after they have gone through them.  
 
Given the several common arguments for exclusive negotiations stated above, some 
governments might choose to avoid the issue altogether by refusing to consider 
unsolicited proposals. Deciding to allow unsolicited proposals is one of the most 
important PPI policy decisions a government can make; it should take the development of 
a corresponding policy very seriously.  
 
If a government chooses to allow unsolicited proposals, the key challenge will be how to 
harness and promote private sector participation during the project conceptualization 
stage without loosing the benefits of increased transparency and efficiency associated 
with a competitive tendering process. As described in section 2, the governments of 
Argentina, Chile, Korea, the Philippines, South Africa, and Taiwan have been 
experimenting with various mechanisms for accomplishing this objective. 
 
                                                 
6 Klein, 1. 
 
 CURRENT SYSTEMS 
 
There is no international standard for managing unsolicited PPI proposals.7 Some 
governments have found it easiest to not allow them at all. Most governments allow 
unsolicited proposals, but do not have special processes for managing them and directly 
negotiate the terms of the project through informal procedures that might involve several 
agencies or ministries. The best approach, when allowing them, is for governments to 
have a clearly articulated rationale for unsolicited proposals and for corresponding 
publicly available procedures for their management. Proponents should know the 
following: 
 
• where to present their proposals, 
• what information is required, and 
• the steps and timeframe for decisions to be made.  
 
The management process for unsolicited proposals in countries that have a formal system 
in place can be divided in two major stages.  
 
1. The first stage is similar in most cases and takes place from the time the 
proponent presents the project to the government until all internal assessments 
and approvals are finished and the project is ready to be publicly tendered.  
 
2. The second stage involves a competitive tender process; approaches tend to 
differ in incentives or benefits to the original proponent of the project.  
Stage 1: Approving Unsolicited Proposals 
 
The countries studied in this paper with advanced systems for managing unsolicited 
proposals follow specific procedures during the first stage (see figure 2.1):  
 
Step 1:  The private proponent first submits a preliminary description of the project 
to the appropriate agency or ministry, which in some countries only contains 
general concepts (for example, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica) and in others 
has detailed information (for example, Korea, South Africa). 
 
Step 2:  After a stipulated review period, the agency or ministry gives a preliminary 
response, usually assessing whether the project serves a “public interest” or 
fits within the strategic infrastructure plan of the federal, state, or provincial 
government. During this review period, the agency or ministry may also 
request additional legal, financial, and environmental studies that the 
proponent will be required to conduct at its own cost. 
                                                 
7 Of the multinational organizations, UNCITRAL maintains guidelines for managing unsolicited proposals 
through its Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects. The UNCITRAL Guide specifically 
addresses the issue of unsolicited proposals (Section II.E). However, the UNCITRAL Guide does not provide 
an extensive framework for channeling unsolicited proposals into a competitive process, rather it only offers 
general suggestions. The World Bank’s Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits mandates 
national and international competitive bidding procedures for outsourced project components. However, the 
document does not specifically address unsolicited proposals and allows direct contracting in a few unique 
circumstances, such as (a) extending existing contracts, (b) standardizing new equipment with original 
equipment, (c) proprietary rights to required equipment, (d) if only one source can meet design specifics, or (e) 
natural disasters (Section 3.7).  5 
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Step 3:       If the preliminary project description is accepted, then the proponent    
usually receives formal recognition for the project concept and finalizes the 
preliminary proposal.8 At this point, the designated agency or ministry 
should have information on (a) the applicant’s role in the concessionaire 
company and its ability to construct and/or operate the project, (b) a 
technical feasibility study, (c) an estimated total project cost and financing 
plan, (d) an income and expenditure plan for operation such as user fee 
revenue, (e) the justification of project need, and (f) environmental or other 
social impact studies. Estimates for future reimbursement of proposal 
development costs are usually carried out at this stage in cases where the 
system allows them (for example, Chile, Costa Rica, and South Africa). 
Submission of a bid bond in order to guarantee the seriousness of the 
proposal might also be required at this time.9 
 
             
Step 4: The detailed proposal is then reviewed, often through modified negotiations 
between the proponent and the appropriate agency or ministry to solidify 
project characteristics (for example, South Africa, Taiwan).10 Some agencies 
or ministries may require additional approval from another government 
agency as well (for example, Korea, Philippines). At the end of the 
stipulated period, the project may be approved for a competitive process or 
rejected. If the project is rejected, then the project proponent may resubmit a 
modified version in some countries or the government may use the concept 
in a public bid after a stipulated period (for example, three years in Chile, 
two years in Argentina).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In Chile, the proponent is required to submit a detailed proposal within 180 days. 
9 Bid bond amounts are associated to estimated project cost. Argentina requires a bid bond equivalent to 
approximately 0.5 percent of project value; in Costa Rica, it cannot exceed more than 1 percent of project 
value. 
10 The detailed project review period is 90 days in the Philippines, 120 days in Korea, 9 months in South Africa, 
and 1 year in Chile. In actuality, further delays are often allowed (for example, in the Philippines) and additional 
time is allowed for the government to prepare the tender documents (3 more months in South Africa, 1 more 
year in Chile). 
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Figure 2.1: Approval Steps for Unsolicited Proposals (Stage 1) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors. 
Stage 2: Tendering Unsolicited Proposals 
 
If accepted, the project moves on to Stage 2 where a competitive process will be carried 
out, typically under one of three systems: bonus, Swiss challenge, or a best and final offer 
system.  
Bonus System 
 
The governments of Chile and Korea use a system to promote unsolicited proposals that 
awards a bonus in the formalized bidding procedure to the original project proponent. 
This bonus can take many forms, but most commonly it is an additional theoretical value 
applied to the original proponent’s technical or financial offer for bidding purposes only. 
In these cases, the original proponent’s offer is selected if it is within a stipulated 
percentage of the best offer in the competitive process. In other cases, the bonus 
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After the review process of Stage 1 is completed, the following procedure takes place 
under a bonus system: 
 
Step 5: Once the project is formally approved, the original project proponent is 
officially awarded the bonus. The value of the bonus is determined by the 
agency or ministry within a maximum (10 percent in Chile and Korea).  
 
Step 6: The project is announced in an official register or gazette and opened to 
public bid under the normal tendering processes outlined in the tender 
documents, as well as in general framework laws (for example, PPI laws, 
build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) laws, concessions laws, and so on). The 
announcement must include the value of the bonus awarded to the original 
proponent and the estimated reimbursable costs for proposal development. 
Competitors are allowed to submit competing bids for a designated time.12  
 
Step 7: During the public bidding phase, the project proponent may bid on the 
project or concession using the bonus or choose not to bid. In Chile, the 
original proponent may also sell the bonus to another bidder. If the original 
project proponent loses the bid or chooses not to bid, then the winning 
bidder might also have to compensate the proponent for project 
development costs, which were stipulated in the public bid documents (for 
example, Chile). Obviously, the original proponent is awarded the project if 
it is the only bidder.  
 
For example, a proponent of the unsolicited proposal is awarded a bonus of 10 percent 
after it proposed a new toll road to the appropriate agency or ministry and went through 
the required approval procedures. In exchange for this bonus, the government has the 
right to make adjustments to the toll road proposal and call for an open tendering process. 
In an open tendering process the participant who bids the lowest tariff per kilometer wins. 
Hypothetically, the original proponent would be awarded the toll road project if it bid 
$0.20 per kilometer and the lowest bidding opponent offered $0.19 per kilometer, 
because the original proponent is within 10 percent of the lowest bid.  
Swiss Challenge System 
 
A common system for introducing unsolicited PPI proposals into a competitive process is 
the Swiss challenge. This procedure—most well known in the Philippines, and also used 
in India (the states of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat), Italy, Taiwan, and the U.S territory 
of Guam— is similar to the bonus system in that it allows a third party to bid on the 
project during a designated time. Instead of providing a pre-determined advantage, 
however, the original proponent has the right to counter-match any superior offers.   
 
After the first stage of the process is completed (see Stage 1: Approving Unsolicited 
Proposals, steps 1–4, described in section 2), the following procedure takes place: 
 
                                                 
12 The closing date to receive bids is specified in the tender documents, usually not before a minimum of 2 
months in Chile or Korea. 
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Step 5:  The project is announced in an official register or gazette and opened to 
public bid under the normal tendering processes, which are outlined in the 
tender documents.  
 
Step 6: In the Philippines, the original project proponent must also submit a bid 
bond during this period equivalent to that required in the tender documents 
for a potential challenger. This bid bond is intended to verify that the 
original proponent has means to fulfill the project. The agency or ministry 
involved has the discretion to publish information regarding the original 
proposal (such as original project pricing and specifications) or to conduct a 
blind challenge.  
 
Step 7: In the Philippines and Guam, when a lower price proposal is submitted and 
approved, the original project proponent will have 30 working days to match 
the price. The Enabling Act in Andhra Pradesh does not specify a timeframe 
for the proponent to match the best bid.  
 
Step 8:  If the original project proponent does not match the price, then the project is 
awarded to the lower price project proponent of the Swiss challenge. In the 
Philippines, the project will be immediately awarded to the original project 
proponent if the price is matched.13 In Guam, when another proponent 
submits a lower price proposal and the original proponent matches that price 
within 30 working days, then the BOT committee will identify which 
proposal has greater technical merit and submit its recommendations to the 
board of directors for disposition. In Gujarat, the original proponent is also 
given 30 days to match the best offer. 
 
Best and Final Offer System 
 
Recently, variations of the bonus and Swiss challenge systems have been developed in 
several countries. The key element of many of these is multiple rounds of tendering, in 
which the original proponent is given the advantage of automatically participating in the 
final round. South Africa uses this best and final offer system, which is somewhat similar 
to the Swiss challenge system. Argentina’s approach contains elements of a bonus 
(approximately 5 percent) and the Swiss challenge system. Costa Rica uses a simpler 
approach with few advantages, but mandates an open competition for all projects in 
which the original proponent can participate. In many cases, similar to the process in 
Chile, the winning bidder must also compensate the original proponent for project 
development costs, which are stipulated in the public bid documents (for example, 
Argentina and Costa Rica). 
 
In general, some of these newer hybrid models follow a similar approach that allows for a 
best and final offer. Once the project proposal completes the initial assessment (see Stage 
1: Approving Unsolicited Proposals, Steps 1–4 described in section 2) and the tender 
documents are ready, the government will invite competing proposals from other 
developers. The procedure continues as follows: 
                                                 
13 See Law Annex No. 2, Republic Act No. 6957, later amended by Republic Act No. 7718, 
http://www.botcenter.gov.ph/botlaw/index.htm. 
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Step 5:  The project is publicized in the official register or gazette inviting proposals 
from third parties. Information about the bid price is not disclosed to the 
other bidders and the proponent has to resubmit a formal bid. 
 
Step 6: Bids are received, evaluated, and ranked. In South Africa, the two most 
advantageous bids are selected in the first round, from which a final round 
of bidding will take place. If the original proponent is not one of these two 
selected, it will then automatically be allowed to compete in the final round 
as well. In Argentina, if the original proponent’s offer is within 5 percent of 
the best offer, then the original proponent’s offer will be selected (it works 
in practice as an automatic 5 percent bonus). However, if the difference 
between the best bid and the original proponent’s offer is more than 5 
percent but less than 20 percent, then the two bidders will be invited to 
submit their best and final offers in a second round.  
 
Step 7: The second round takes place where best and final offers are requested only 
from those selected in the first round. Information about bid prices is not 
disclosed. The preferred bid will only be selected in the second and final 
round. In Argentina, if the original proponent’s offer is not selected in this 
final round, the selected bidder will then reimburse proposal development 
costs equivalent to 1 percent of the estimated project cost, according to the 
bidding documents. In South Africa, the winning bidder is also required to 
compensate the proponent for project development costs, which are 
stipulated in the public bid documents. 
 
 
  
POLICY CHOICES  
 
 
If a government intends to actively pursue a PPI program, then the private sector most 
likely will come forward with its own ideas. The respective results to date with regards to 
overall number of unsolicited proposals presented for certain countries are listed in table  
 
 
Table 3.1: Results of Unsolicited Proposals in Selected Countries  
 
Country Period Presented Accepted Under 
review 
Rejected Tendered or
completed 
Chile 1995–March 2006 200+ 26 38 140+ 12
Korea (Rep. of) July 1999–April 2006 141 101 7 33 65
South Africa 1999–2006 4 0 3 1 0
Taiwan (China) March 2002–May 
2006 
193 29 22 142 29
 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Though under no obligation to accept unsolicited proposals, governments will be 
pressured by special interests to consider some of them. The experiences reviewed 
demonstrate that a government is better equipped to handle these pressures if a 
transparent system for unsolicited proposal management is already in place.    
 
Importantly, a competitive mechanism to determine the final project developer is also 
fundamental to successfully managing unsolicited proposals. Though a few exceptional 
circumstances may justify sole-source negotiation with the original proponent (such as 
natural disasters), a predefined competitive mechanism will help policy makers to 
safeguard against the common arguments for exclusivity often presented by private 
developers.   
 
Developing an effective system to manage unsolicited proposals is not easy, however. 
Governments are faced with many trade-offs. Policy makers must address questions such 
as the amount of reimbursement (if any) for project development costs to the original 
proponent, any time constraints during the approval and challenging processes, 
coordinating among various agencies, effectively planning for sectorwide development, 
and finding the appropriate incentives for the private sector to initiate projects.  
 
Reimbursing for Project Development Costs  
 
If the original project proponent is unsuccessful in the bidding process, it might expect 
reimbursement of development costs from the government, the winning bidder, or both. 
Proponents invest time and money into the projects and claim that they should be 
compensated for their efforts. However, determining the true value for the project 
concept and development is not always easy and the original proponents will logically 
want the highest appraisal possible. Furthermore, overly generous compensation may 
induce proponents to come forward with unnecessary projects.  
 11 
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Surprisingly, some countries that offer reimbursement costs—such as Argentina, Chile, 
Italy, and South Africa—have not approved many unsolicited projects. Korea, Taiwan, 
and the Philippines, which do not offer reimbursement, have approved substantially more 
projects and have a higher percentage of unsolicited projects. Therefore, the 
reimbursement of development costs has not necessarily attracted more unsolicited 
projects in these countries.   
 
Table 3.2 lists some issues to consider when deciding the amount (if any) of project 
development costs to be reimbursed in the tender documents. 
 
Table 3.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Offering Reimbursement for 
Development Costs 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Legal respect for intellectual property rights are 
essential to sustainable private sector 
development  
• Reimbursement maintains private sector 
interest in the project development phase 
• PPI ideas will not be limited only to large 
companies or developers who have deep 
pockets 
• The amount of financial compensation for 
project development costs can be determined 
through the estimated market value for the 
project proposal or an independent audit 
• Developers will allocate the necessary 
resources to make sure that the project is 
developed professionally 
• Reimbursement encourages innovation 
• The number of frivolous projects may increase 
because developers might not intend to bid in 
the tender process, but only to profit from a 
project concept 
• Original project proponents may exaggerate 
project development costs to discourage 
challengers once a project is given formal 
approval 
• Challengers are at a financial disadvantage 
because reimbursement adds extra project 
finance expenses into calculation of tariff 
• Government will have to allocate additional 
resources to determine if requested 
reimbursement is accurate 
 
 
Source: Authors.  
Establishing Time Constraints   
 
In many countries, the government specifies the time allotted to complete certain stages 
of the approval and bidding phases. The PPI laws usually specify a time limit for 
preliminary approval for the project, reaching a finalized project, putting the project out 
to public bid, and a closing date for challengers to submit counter-proposals.  
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Table 3.3: Time Allocations for Bidding and Approval 
 
 Preliminary 
approval 
Final 
approval 
Call for open 
tenders 
Challenge or 
counter 
Additional 
time 
Total time 
Argentina 90 days   60 days Undetermined n.a. n.a. 
Chile 45 days 12 months 12 months Approximatel
y 2–4 months 
n.a. 33–35 months 
Costa Rica 45 days 4 months 12 months Not 
applicable 
n.a. 17+ months 
Guam (U.S. 
territory) 
Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined 60 days n.a. n.a. 
Italy 4 months 2 months 3 months n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Korea, Rep. 
of 
15 days 4 months Undetermined Approximatel
y 2–4 months 
n.a. 6.5–8.5+ 
months 
Philippines 2 months 3 months Undetermined 2 months 1 month to 
counter match 
8+ months 
South Africa 1 month 9 months 3 months 2 months 2 months to 
evaluate 
17 months 
 
 
Source: Authors, based on laws and regulations (see appendix C). 
Note: n.a. = not applicable. 
 
The original project proponent has an obvious competitive advantage with time 
constraints for counter-proposals. The proponent has spent considerable time and effort 
preparing the project and subsequently is much more familiar with the project 
characteristics. An opponent, however, is usually given only a short time to challenge the 
project, as little as 60 days (for example, in Guam and the Philippines). Many potential 
challengers may not be willing to compete without sufficient time to prepare.  
Table 3.4 lists some issues to consider when determining time constraints. 
 
Table 3.4: Time Allocation Considerations 
Process Issues 
Approve preliminary Proposal • Governments typically use a short initial period to screen out unnecessary 
proposals 
• The process allows proponents to test concepts without dedicating 
extensive resources to project development 
Negotiate and finalize project • The government may require new information and consultations with 
outside experts to improve the project 
• A reasonable amount of time is required to repackage unsolicited proposal 
as a government-managed, solicited public tender (for example, Chile, 
Costa Rica) 
• Without final project approval times specified, some projects are negotiated 
over several years without threat of a looming deadline 
• A proponent often needs to obtain permits or licenses in other departments 
Put out to bid • Delays allow original proponent additional preparation time to that is not 
challengers 
• An unspecified deadline causes some projects to remain inactive for 
indefinite periods 
• Government inactivity may lock up proponent’s financial resources such as 
guarantees and bid bonds 
Submit counter proposals • A common complaint is that the challenge period (for example, 60 days in 
Philippines) is not sufficient to conduct technical due diligence and to 
develop the business plan, financial model, and economic bid 
• Challengers may need substantial time to raise financing 
 
Source: Authors. 
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Coordinating Among Agencies or Ministries 
 
In most countries, the planning and coordination of major infrastructure projects (such as 
energy or transportation) fall within the competence of different government agencies 
and ministries. Local and state governments will also be involved if the project falls 
within their jurisdiction. This can be a heavy burden for proponents of unsolicited 
proposals if coordination and communication are lacking between the relevant 
government entities.  
 
In Taiwan, foreign companies and chambers of commerce have raised this lack of 
coordination and communication as a practical concern and hurdle to further foreign 
participation. In the Philippines, amendments to the BOT law are being proposed to 
create a single BOT authority to rationalize the implementation of the BOT program and 
to be the sole and exclusive approving authority for BOT/private sector participation 
(PSP) projects for national government agencies. 
 
Effective Sector Planning 
 
Allowing the private sector to present proposals in sectors that are part of network 
infrastructure could be cause for concern. In theory, the private sector’s only concern is 
making a return on its investment without consideration for the general welfare or overall 
economic benefit of the country. For example, a private developer would have little 
concern if by proposing a new tourist recreational area it is diminishing the 
country/state’s port expansion capacity in the medium or long term.  
 
In order to address such concerns, countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Italy only 
allow unsolicited proposals for projects that are part of its strategic infrastructure 
investment plan. In these cases, the government periodically defines the priorities in the 
different sectors in broad terms, leaving project details to be developed by interested 
parties. For example, the government determines the need for connecting two cities with 
a paved road, but will leave it to project developers to estimate traffic flows, determine 
number of lanes needed, allow for commercial facilities to be developed along the route, 
and so on. 
 
Finding Appropriate Incentives  
 
It is not easy to find the right balance between incentives for the private sector to propose 
beneficial projects and a sufficient probability of successful challenges so that third 
parties will actually submit counter-proposals. The challenger’s perceived chances of 
winning theoretically would influence the number of overall unsolicited projects.  
 
If a challenger has almost an equal chance of winning, then the private sector will be 
reluctant to come forward with many unsolicited proposals knowing they may be easily 
defeated. If challengers do not perceive a real chance of winning, then they will be less 
likely to offer counter-proposals and original proponents will feel better about their 
chances, thus offering more unsolicited proposals. 
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In theory, both the bonus and Swiss challenge systems provide challengers with a 
reasonable chance of winning. In actuality, challengers are rarely successful in some 
countries, as demonstrated by the small number of challenges and subsequent victorious 
counter-proposals to date in Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. However, some systems 
might not have a significant competitive advantage for the original project proponent 
because challenges are regularly successful (for example, Chile).  
 
Table 3.5 lists several factors that influence the challenger’s perceived chances of 
winning.  
 
Table 3.5: Considerations for Potential Challengers 
Influencing factor Issues 
Value of bonus  
(under bonus system) 
 
• A large bonus will discourage potential challengers, a low bonus 
will discourage submitting unsolicited proposals 
• A bonus may be used for a technical score (Korea) or economic 
score (Argentina, Chile) 
Ability to match price 
(under Swiss challenge) 
• Many challengers are reluctant to allocate resources for counter-
proposals because they can be matched 
• Sufficient time is required to develop counter-proposals 
Amount and timing of 
information disclosed 
• Information on the original proponent’s economic offer may entice 
challengers to offer counter-proposals, especially if tariff is very 
high 
• If the original proponent’s bid is not disclosed, then it is more likely 
that challengers will present their best offers. The sooner that vital 
information is available to challengers, the lower the advantage to 
the original proponent will be in project preparation  
Process transparency • If challengers feel that information is withheld or that the process is 
corrupt, they will be less likely to challenge 
• Transparency will assist challengers in their efforts to raise 
international financing and partners 
 
 
Source: Authors.  
 
 APPENDIX A  
 
Table A.1: Proposal Systems by Country or State  
Country or 
State 
Legal Framework Type of 
system 
Reimbursement 
of development 
costs? 
Bid bond 
required? 
Intellectual property 
rights 
Andhra Pradesh  
(India) 
AP Infrastructure 
Development 
Enabling Act No. 
36, 2001 
Swiss 
challenge 
Yes, by 
government 
No After reimbursement 
proposal becomes 
property of government 
Argentina Presidential Decree 
966, 2005 
Bonus and 
best and final 
offer 
Yes, by the 
winning bidder 
1% of estimated 
project cost 
Yes, 
0.05% of 
estimated 
project cost 
After 2 years proposal 
becomes property of 
government 
Chile Supreme Decree 
956, 1999 
Bonus Yes, by winning 
bidder 
reimbursement 
costs approved at 
the initial stage 
Yes, according 
to project value 
* 
Costa Rica Decree 31836, July 
2004 
None Yes, by winning 
bidder 
reimbursement 
costs approved at 
the initial stage 
Yes, not higher 
than 
1% of estimated 
project cost 
After reimbursement 
proposal becomes 
property of government 
Guam  
(U.S. territory) 
Public Law 24-294 
1998 
Swiss 
challenge 
No No * 
Gujarat 
(India) 
Gujarat 
Infrastructure 
Development Act 
No. 11, 1999 
Swiss 
challenge 
Yes, by 
government 
No 
 
After reimbursement 
proposal becomes 
property of government 
Indonesia Presidential 
Regulation No. 67, 
2005 
Bonus or 
purchase of 
proposal 
Yes, when bonus is 
not granted. 
Costs paid by 
government or by 
winning bidder. 
* * 
Korea, Rep. of Act on private 
participation in 
infrastructure 
Bonus No No * 
The Philippines BOT law Swiss 
challenge 
No * * 
South Africa Policy of SANRAL 
in respect of 
unsolicited 
proposals 
Best and final 
offers 
Yes, by winning 
bidder 
reimbursement 
costs approved at 
the initial stage 
* * 
Sri Lanka Guidelines on 
private sector 
infrastructure  
Same as 
solicited 
projects  
No * No 
Taiwan (China) Guidelines for 
Evaluation of 
Unsolicited 
Proposals, March 
2002 
Combined 
bonus and 
Swiss 
challenge 
No * * 
Virginia 
(United States) 
Public-Private 
Transportation Act 
of 1995. Va. Code 
Ann. §§56-560 
Same as 
solicited 
projects 
No No Public entity shall take 
appropriate action to 
protect confidential and 
proprietary information 
 
 
Source: Authors. 
Note: SANRAL = South African National Roads Agency Limited. 
*Not specific to these laws or regulations.  
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APPENDIX B  
 
PROCEDURES FOR UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS: SUMMARIES BY 
COUNTRY AND STATE   
ARGENTINA 
 
Presidential Decree 966 (2005) regulates the process for unsolicited proposals submitted 
by private parties seeking contracts related to public works, services, and concessions. 
Like other country systems described in this paper, unsolicited project presentations need 
to fulfill minimum requirements to be considered by the government. The Argentine 
system requires an up-front bid bond together with the project details, feasibility studies, 
estimated investment amounts, proponent references, and financing sources that should 
only be private. Unsolicited proposals will not be considered if public financing is 
required to develop the project.   
 
All unsolicited proposals are preliminarily assessed by an ad-hoc commission created to 
evaluate unsolicited proposals jointly integrated by the Ministry of Federal Planning and 
the Ministry of Finance. Other line ministries will also be required to intervene if the 
nature of the project falls under their competence.   
 
Within 60 days, the administration should conduct the initial assessment; if there is 
interest in the proposal and the project serves a public interest, then the proponent is 
invited to present a full detailed proposal. At this stage, the administration will list all 
legal, financial, and environmental studies that the proponent will be required to conduct. 
The administration will also estimate reimbursement of proposal development costs (an 
amount that should not exceed 1 percent of project’s value). Such costs will only be 
reimbursed at the end of the process if a party different than the original proponent is 
awarded the contract. The proponent will not be entitled to reimbursement of expenses if 
its proposal is not declared admissible during the evaluation process. 
 
The advantages granted to the original proponent are a mixture of the bonus and the best 
and final offer systems as follows: 
 
• If the difference between the best bid and the original proponent’s bid is less 
than 5 percent, then the original proponent’s bid is selected. Basically, a fixed 
pre-determined 5 percent bonus is implicit in favor of the project proponent. 
• If the difference between the best bid and the original proponent’s bid is more 
than 5 percent but less than 20 percent, then the best bidder and the original 
proponent will be invited to re-submit best and final offers. In this last final 
round, the 5 percent bonus does not apply. 
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AUSTRALIA  
New South Wales 
  
The current guidelines for managing privately financed projects and unsolicited proposals 
are titled, Working with Government Guidelines for Privately Financed Projects 
(November 2001).14  Most unsolicited proposals also involve a request for direct 
negotiations with the government. The New South Wales (NSW) Independent 
Commission against Corruption issued Guidelines for Direct Negotiations in 
Procurement and Disposals.15  
 
Unsolicited proposals are received and assessed for strategic priority, value for money, 
public interest, and justification for direct negotiations. This assessment is extremely 
rigorous; it has proven difficult for proponents to achieve success. The NSW 
government’s aim is not to find new sources of capital investment, but to employ 
privately financed projects only where they provide real value for money through 
innovation, effective risk transfer, and efficient management of infrastructure and 
delivery of associated services. 
 
The focus of Working with Government Guidelines for Privately Financed Projects is on 
intellectual property as grounds for direct negotiations, but in practice, this protection has 
been difficult to justify. The NSW government can always open the competition by 
requiring outcome-based terms. Since the publication of these Guidelines, 10 unsolicited 
proposals have been formally submitted and assessed. About twice that many potential 
projects have been discussed, which, following initial consideration and discussions with 
proponents, have not been formally submitted. Early consultation is encouraged so that 
proposals with little chance of success are identified and eliminated before excessive 
private and public sector resources are committed to project development. 
 
Of the 10 unsolicited proposals that have been formally submitted and assessed, the NSW 
government accepted only one and it has now been delivered. The project had a relatively 
low value (approximately $15 million) and it relied on real property rather than 
intellectual property as the grounds for direct negotiations (the developer owned 
adjoining land to a public site) so the project was not subject to public tender. 
 
Queensland 
 
In September 2001, the Queensland government released its policy on public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). The Guidance Material sets out a comprehensive framework for 
analyzing and delivering all major infrastructure projects that support the government’s 
strategic objectives. 
 
According to the Guidance Material, if an agency receives an unsolicited proposal from a 
private party addressing a service requirement identified by that party, then the proposal 
must first be assessed for priority against the relevant agency’s strategic plan and the state 
                                                 
14 See http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/wwg/pdf/wwgguidelines.pdf. 
15 See http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/files/pdf/pub2_26cp.pdf. 
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infrastructure plan. If the agency considers the proposal to be a priority, then the proposal 
can follow one of two courses of action: 
 
• It can be treated in the same manner as agency-generated outputs (solicited 
project), or 
• It can be awarded an exclusive mandate, which gives the private party the right 
to fully develop its proposal without competition.  
 
Exclusive mandates are granted at the government’s sole discretion. The unsolicited 
proposal must meet the following criteria to be considered by the government in 
exclusivity: 
 
• A proposal addressing the same or similar need is not already being considered 
by the government or already under active and advanced consideration by any 
other private sector party, and 
• The private sector party satisfies the government that it has demonstrable 
commercial advantage over other proponents and that calling for expressions of 
interest could not be reasonably expected to generate a better value-for-money 
outcome. 
 
Exclusive mandates will not be granted when the unsolicited proposal is seeking to place 
risk, cost, or payment obligations upon the government. In such cases, the proposal must 
be subjected to a competitive bidding process to ensure that it represents a value-for-
money outcome for the government. When processing unsolicited (and all other) 
proposals, the government will take all reasonable steps to protect genuine intellectual 
property of the private sector by using an output-based specification during the 
competitive process. 
 
Victoria 
 
The Australian state of Victoria has been a leader for PPP development. The state 
government policy on PPPs, released in 2001, does not define a procedure for 
departments and agencies to apply to unsolicited proposals. However, Chapter 21 of 
Partnerships Victoria Practitioner’s Guide16 sets out general principles, which include:  
 
• Adopt mechanisms to ensure that open competitive bidding is maintained as far 
as possible; 
 
• Inform the private party that they are required to identify specifically the 
intellectual property they want to protect, before any proposal discussion begin; 
 
• Return intellectual property to the owner while the service need is put to the 
market in a manner that accommodates, but does not divulge, the intellectual 
property. The owner of the intellectual property is free to include it in a bid or to 
join with other bidders; and 
 
                                                 
16 See 
http://www.partnerships.vic.gov.au/CA25708500035EB6/WebObj/PVGuidanceMaterial_PracGuide/$File/P
VGuidanceMaterial_PracGuide.pdf. 
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• Adopt a course that avoids putting others to the cost of preparing fruitless bids in 
the rare circumstances where the intellectual property is of such outstanding value 
that a competitive market for the service need would not exist. This course may 
be to remove the intellectual property from the project solution and to put the 
remainder of the project out for competitive bidding. Such a course could be 
adopted if the government is first able to obtain rights to the intellectual property 
through a negotiation process open to appropriate scrutiny and using sound 
evaluation techniques. 
 
Competitive bidding remains the general principle to pursue projects involving the 
private sector. However, the Victorian government wishes to promote discussion on ideas 
for improving the quality of infrastructure and services; these principles are a response to 
the private sector’s reluctance to present unsolicited proposals for fear of exposing 
intellectual property to the market through the bidding process.  
 
CANADA 
 
British Columbia 
 
The government of British Columbia does not have a specific framework for managing 
unsolicited proposals for infrastructure projects. Guidelines such as the Capital Asset 
Management Framework17 (CAMF) were developed to support provincial public-sector 
agencies to find the best solutions and apply best practices in managing capital assets. 
The standards and processes are applied to an asset’s full life cycle involving planning, 
acquisition, operation, maintenance, renewal, or disposal. 
 
Section 8.4.5 of the CAMF explains the procedure when agencies receive proposals from 
the private sector for a specific project or service. First, agencies review the proposals at 
a conceptual level (pre-feasibility analysis) to determine the following:  
 
• whether the proposal has the support of both the agency responsible and the 
ministry responsible (if applicable), 
• whether the proposal relates to a need supported by the agency or ministry, 
and 
• whether the proposal appears to be feasible. 
 
Proposals that do meet the stage-one criteria proceed to stage two in order to analyze the 
following: 
 
• whether the proposal is in line with the provincial strategic priorities, 
• whether it can be accommodated within the province’s fiscal framework, and 
• whether it will provide value for money and protect the public interest. 
 
Unsolicited proposals that pass the prefeasibility analysis are assessed on the same basis 
as proposals received through a competitive solicitation process. They must undergo 
complete value-for-money and risk assessment, using an appropriate public sector 
                                                 
17 See http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/pt/dmb/cpf.shtml. 
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comparator (PSC) where applicable. A competitive public process will follow where the 
original proponent will participate on the same terms as any other bidders. The 
framework does not allow reimbursement of project development costs. 
 
In exceptional cases where the proposal has unique aspects such that the terms could not 
reasonably be expected to be matched or improved upon by any other proponent (for 
example, a proponent owns the only viable project site), the agency may work with the 
proponent to develop a more detailed proposal, business case, or both. Before negotiating 
contract terms, the agency must issue a public notice of intent to award a contract. The 
purpose of this notice is to validate that no other proponent can reasonably be expected to 
meet or exceed the terms of the proposed contract. 
 
Ontario 
 
In July 2004, the government of Ontario introduced a comprehensive framework, 
Building a Better Tomorrow: An Infrastructure Planning, Financing, and Procurement 
Framework for Ontario’s Public Sector (IPFP) which supports the government’s 10-year 
infrastructure plans for the province.18 The framework defines the roles and 
responsibilities of government agencies, ministries, municipalities, and the private sector 
in approving and managing the planning, financing, and procurement of public 
infrastructure assets.  
 
The IPFP framework recognizes that the private sector has advantages over the public 
sector, and vice versa, in some areas of infrastructure and service delivery, which is 
particularly pertinent for risk management and the associated costs of risk transfer. For 
example, the private sector can more aptly manage commercial risk, whereas the public 
sector is best positioned to manage regulatory risk.  
 
According to the framework, Ontario ministries are responsible for submitting 
infrastructure plans, so proponents should work though the appropriate infrastructure 
(capital) ministry. One paragraph (in section 3.2) refers specifically to unsolicited 
proposals: 
 
Decisions on infrastructure planning, financing, and procurement will be made 
based on the government’s 3- and 10-year infrastructure investment plans and its 
annual infrastructure planning process. Unsolicited proposals should conform to 
meet the guidelines in the framework and be forwarded to Public Infrastructure 
Renewal Ministry and the appropriate infrastructure ministry for consideration. 
To be considered, proposals must be consistent with the strategic priorities laid 
out in the government’s investment plans and meet the tests outlined in the 
framework.  
 
CHILE 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Chile urgently needed major infrastructure investments to 
ensure its economic development, but the government did not have the resources or 
                                                 
18 See http://www.pir.gov.on.ca/userfiles/HTML/cma_4_35661_1.html. 
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expertise to carry out the large scale of public works required. To face this challenge, the 
government called on the private sector to take part in the building, maintenance, and 
operation of major public works. The concessions system originated to give the private 
sector a key role by allowing it to finance economically profitable projects and to recover 
their investment through direct charges to the users. 
 
The process to manage unsolicited proposals is detailed in the main concessions law; the 
process details are in secondary legislation.19 Line ministries have responsibility for 
managing pubic-private partnership transactions, including unsolicited proposals 
presented by the private sector. The Ministry of Public Works (not the Ministry of 
Transportation and Telecommunications) oversaw the concession program in the 
transport sector, where many of the unsolicited proposals were focused.  
 
Since 1992, more than 200 unsolicited proposals were presented to the administration; 12 
resulted in contract award (see table B.1), another 14 received preliminary approval and 
are being reviewed, and the remaining proposals were rejected.20   
                                                 
19 The main applicable laws and regulations are: the supreme decree law of the Ministry of Public Works No. 
294 (1984), which sets out the reformulated text of Law 15.840, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public 
Works, which, in Article 87, authorizes the ministry to carry out public works through the concessions system.  
20 A total of 224 unsolicited proposals were presented to the Ministry of Public Works. Because 14 were 
considered duplicates, the remaining 210 qualified as valid proposals, thus the total used is 210. Sistema de 
Concesiones en Chile 1990–2003. (June 2003), 52. 
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Table B.1: Unsolicited Projects Awarded in Chile, as of March 2006 
Project  Type Investment 
(millions) 
Concession 
period 
(years) 
Participants 
in tender 
process 
Bonus 
value 
Winner Was bonus 
a factor? 
Award 
date 
Highway 57: 
Santiago–
Colina–Los 
Andes  
Highway 
upgrade 
$138 28 1 10% Bonus holder n.a. Dec. 
1996 
Melipilla Bypass New 
highway 
$21 30 3 10% Non-bonus 
holder 
No Aug.  
2001 
Inter-Port 
Highway: 
Talcahuano–
Penco 
New 
highway 
$25 30 3 10% Bonus holder No Jan.  
2002 
Puerto Montt 
Airport  
Expansion $7 12 2 20% Non-bonus 
holder 
No June  
1995 
Iquique Airport Expansion $6 12 3 20% Bonus holder No Aug.  
1995 
Calama Airport Expansion $4.5 10 4 10% Bonus holder No Oct.  
1997 
Concepción 
Airport  
Expansion $25 17 7 10% Non-bonus 
holder 
No March 
1999 
Cerro Moreno, 
Antofagasta 
Airport 
Expansion $7.5 10 5 10% Non-bonus 
holder 
No Dec.  
1999 
Access Road, 
Airport Santiago 
Urban 
highway 
$9 12 1 20% Bonus holder n.a. Jan.  
1996 
Américo 
Vespucio 
Northwest 
System 
Urban 
highway 
$320 30 4 10% Non-bonus 
holder 
No March 
2002 
Américo 
Vespucio South 
System 
Urban 
highway 
$270 30 4 10% Non-bonus 
holder 
No Aug.  
2001 
Av. El Salto-Av. 
Kennedy Bypass 
Urban tunnel $70 32 2 10% Non-bonus 
holder 
No Oct.  
2004 
Total: 12  $903       
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on data from Ministry of Public Works, Chile (see 
appendix C). 
Note: n.a. = not applicable. 
 
The contracts awarded to the private sector that were unsolicited proposals represent 
approximately 12 percent of total investment of the concessions program portfolio. Since 
the beginning of the concessions program in 1993, 48 contracts with private participation 
have been awarded, representing an investment of more than $7 billion. Out of the 48 
contracts, 12 originated as unsolicited proposals, totaling $851 million.21 
 
                                                 
21 See Sistema de Concesiones de Obras Públicas. Cartera de Proyectos 2005–07. Gobierno de Chile. 
Ministerio de Obras Públicas. Coordinación General de Concesiones. Financial Projections for the Public 
Sector 2007–09. Ministerio de Hacienda. Dirección de Presupuesto. Commitments under the Concessions 
System. 
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For the first two airport concessions, the bonus was valued at 20 percent, which is 
subtracted from the original proponent’s economic offer (lowest passenger departure fee). 
The Chilean government reduced the bonus to 10 percent for the third airport concession 
in December 1996 and it has remained the same. 
 
Surprisingly, the ownership of a bonus in all 12 projects has not been very advantageous 
to the original project proponent in the bidding process. Though the bonus holder 
receives compensation for project development costs if unsuccessful in the tender process 
and a bonus could have scared away other potential bidders, the bonus did not in any case 
determine the award of the project (that is, the same party would have won in the absence 
of the bonus), although in most cases (10 out of 12 projects) there was more than one 
bidder.  
 
The market for unsolicited proposals remains active in Chile even though a bidder other 
than the original proponent was awarded the project in the majority of the cases. As of 
March 2006, 14 proposals worth more than $1 billion have received declaration of public 
interest and have been preliminarily approved and another 38 proposals representing 
approximately $3.7 billion are in the pipeline undergoing initial screening.    
COSTA RICA 
 
The 1998 Public Works Concession Law in Costa Rica allows the private sector to 
present unsolicited proposals.22 However, the Executive Decree detailing the process to 
handle unsolicited proposals was not passed until July 2004.  
 
The system in Costa Rica follows a two- stage process similar to those in other countries. 
In the first stage, the private proponent submits a preliminary project presentation to the 
appropriate agency or ministry that will assess whether the project serves a public 
interest. Within 45 days, the administration should conduct the initial assessment and if 
there is interest in the proposal, allow the private party to present a full detailed proposal. 
At this stage, the administration will list all legal, financial, and environmental studies 
that the proponent will be required to conduct and will estimate reimbursement of 
proposal development costs. Such costs will only be reimbursed at the end of the process 
if a party different that the original proponent is awarded the contract.  
 
Also at this preliminary stage, the proponent is required to submit a bid bond to guarantee 
that its proposal which cannot exceed more than 1 percent of the estimated project value. 
Once the complete proposal is submitted within the stipulated period, the administration 
has four months to accept or reject the project. If the project is accepted, then the 
administration will conduct a public tender according to the procedure stipulated for 
solicited projects. The original proponent is allowed to participate under the same terms 
and conditions as any other bidder.  
 
An interesting aspect of the Costa Rican regulation is that it requires decentralized 
agencies and state-owned companies to assign or establish a specific unit within their 
organizations to handle unsolicited proposals. Alternatively, decentralized agencies can 
subscribe collaboration agreements with the National Concessions Council in the 
                                                 
22 Public Works Concession Law No. 7762, Article 20. 
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Ministry of Public Works (Consejo Nacional de Conseciones), the competent agency at 
the national level, to evaluate unsolicited projects on their behalf.   
 
Since the Executive Decree was approved in July 2004, only one project falling under the 
competence of the National Concessions Council was presented. A Colombian company, 
Conalvías, proposed upgrading the Highway between San Jose and Limon. The proposal 
was rejected because it did not fit the ministry’s master plans for that route. However, the 
ministry has not made the master plan public, and the administration’s inactivity has 
many critics. 
 
In December 2005, to avoid being crowded with proposals that it cannot properly assess 
(mostly due to lack of in-house capacity) the Executive Branch by decree froze the 
receipt of unsolicited proposals. The measure is intended to be temporary until the 
ministries and decentralized agencies announce the list of projects that are appropriate for 
private sector involvement.     
INDIA 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
 
The Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act (No. 36 of 2001) applies 
to all infrastructure projects implemented through PPPs.  
As in Gujarat, (discussed later) the state of Andhra Pradesh allows project developers to 
approach the government with their proposals and, apart from the cases where direct 
negotiations are permitted, the enabling act requires agencies to follow a Swiss challenge 
approach. 
The Swiss challenge approach will be used if the project has any of the following 
requirements: 
  
• extensive administrative and asset support from the government, 
• central and extensive state level clearances, 
• fiscal incentives,  
• land lease at concessional rents, or 
• exclusive rights granted to the project developer. 
 
If the Swiss challenge approach is pursued, then the original proponent is expected to 
submit a detailed proposal, which should include technical, commercial, financial, and 
other details of the project and principles of the concession agreement. The government 
will invite competing proposals from other developers; the initial proponent has a right to 
match or improve upon the competing offer in a stipulated timeframe. Otherwise, the 
developer who submitted a superior offer will be awarded the project.  
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Gujarat 
 
The state of Gujarat in India regulates the procedure to handle unsolicited proposals in its 
Infrastructure Development Act (No. 11 of 1999, amended by Act No.18 of 2006).23 
Gujarat allows the presentation of proposals by the private sector to the different state 
agencies. Once the technical and financial aspects of the proposal have been considered 
(which might include modifications to the original presentation in consultation with the 
proponent), the proposal is submitted to the State Infrastructure Development Board. The 
board will consider the proposal if the cost of the project exceeds a certain limit and if no 
financial assistance (subsidy) is required from the government. The board can return the 
proposal with or without modifications or for reconsideration.  
Once the terms of the proposal are finalized, the specified government agency will follow 
the same procedure of competitive public bidding. Once a third party is selected 
following the competitive public bidding, the original proponent will be given an 
opportunity to make its proposal competitive within 30 days. If the original proponent 
fails to make a matching offer, then the government agency will reimburse the 
preparation cost of the proposal and transfer it to the government agency. 
The experience in the state of Gujarat is still limited. As of April 2006, 5 project 
proposals—all in the power sector—have been presented as unsolicited under section 10 
of Gujarat Infrastructure Development Act of 1999. Four proposals were accepted and 
preparations for conducting a tendering process are underway. The total value of the 
approved projects proposed is approximately $31 million. Because none of the projects 
has been awarded, the success of the system is yet to be tested.  
INDONESIA  
 
Indonesia regulates private sector involvement in infrastructure in the Presidential 
Regulation Concerning Government Cooperation with Business Entities in the Supply of 
Infrastructure (No. 67 of 2005). Under Indonesian law, PPPs are referred to as 
cooperation projects that entail the supply of infrastructure conducted through a 
cooperation agreement (a written covenant between the minister and the business entity) 
or a business operation permit (a permit granted by the minister to the business entity). In 
both cases the business entity is identified through public auction. The minister or 
regional head is in charge of identifying projects that are for partnership with the private 
entities and, following public consultations, a list of project priorities is publicly 
announced and disseminated.   
 
Unsolicited proposals are addressed in Chapter IV, under “Cooperation Projects at the 
Initiative of Business Entities.” Business entities are allowed to propose projects that are 
not included in the list of priority projects. Article 11 requires unsolicited proposals to 
include the following items:   
• a feasibility study,  
• a cooperation formation plan, 
• a plan for project financing and funding resources, and 
                                                 
23 See http://www.gidb.org. 
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• a plan for a cooperation offer that includes schedule, process, and 
evaluation method. 
 
Like projects to be conducted in cooperation with business entities, unsolicited projects 
should also consider the following aspects: 
 
• suitability with the national or regional medium-term development plan and 
the infrastructure sector strategic plan, 
• suitability of the project location with the regional spatial plan  
• the relationship among infrastructure sectors and among regions, and  
• the cost analysis and social benefits.    
 
The minister, institution head, or regional head will evaluate proposals to determine if 
they fulfill the feasibility requirements outlined above. Projects deemed feasible will be 
processed through public auction following the same procurement process as solicited 
projects.  
 
The Indonesian system rewards the original proponent in one of two forms: 
 
(1) By granting the proposal an added value (bonus) not to exceed 10 percent of the 
proponent’s tender and to be openly announced before to the procurement 
process, or 
(2) By purchasing the project proposal (including intellectual property rights) by the 
government or the winner of the tender. 
In both cases, the minister, institution head, or regional head determines the amount of 
added value or the value of costs to be reimbursed to purchase the project proposal, based 
on the consideration of an independent appraiser before the procurement process. 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  
 
The Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) program of the Republic of Korea was 
formally launched in 1994. The limited success of the initial effort and the effect of the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 led the government to introduce a new PPI law in 1998 to 
revive the program. 
  
The goal of the PPI Act passed in 1998 was to provide more incentives for the private 
sector to participate in PPI projects. It introduced of a set of provisions to allow 
unsolicited projects that had been absent in the old PPI law. The 1998 framework for 
handling unsolicited proposals had specific provisions to encourage the private sector to 
develop and present proposals for infrastructure projects. Specifically, the 1998 PPI law 
allowed the following incentives for the initial proponent: 
 
• bonus evaluation points,  
• minimum revenue guarantees,24 and 
• foreign exchange guarantees. 
 
                                                 
24 Minimum revenue guarantees for unsolicited proposals were abolished in the 2006 Annual Plan by the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget. Dr. Young-Geun Lee. 
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Following the 1998 PPI Act, the Ministry of Planning and Budget established the Private 
Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (PICKO) as a specialized agency to provide 
technical assistance to competent authorities on the preparation of feasibility studies and 
PPP project tenders. In January 2005, the government passed an amendment to the 1998 
Act on PPI, establishing the Public and Private Infrastructure Investment Management 
Center (PIMAC) as a successor unit.25 
 
The Korean PPP market is characterized by a high number of unsolicited proposals. 
Between July 1999 and April 2006, approximately 141 unsolicited proposals with project 
costs estimated at $40.4 billion26 were presented to PICKO/PIMAC. Of the 141 
submissions, 101 proposals were accepted (they reached preliminary approval stage), 33 
were rejected, and 7 are under review (see table B.2).  
 
 
Table B.2: Unsolicited Proposals Submitted in Korea, 1999–2006 
Status 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Presented 5 27 15 21 38 15 19 1 141
Under review 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
Rejected 3 7 2 10 9 0 2 0 33
Accepted 2 20 13 11 29 15 11 0 101
 
 
Source: PIMAC. 
 
In terms of competition, 65 projects have already undergone a public tender process. On 
average, although third parties presented competitive bids, a third party won the bidding 
in only 6 cases. The bonus points awarded in the evaluation were between 0 and 6 
percent (2.7 percent on average). In the 6 projects won by third party bidders, the bonus 
was between 0 and 4 percent, which means out of 1,000 points, the original proponent 
received 20–40 points more than a third party. The bonus points do not seem to be a main 
factor to decide a preferred bidder. Furthermore, when the original proponent submits a 
modified proposal in the process of inviting alternative proposals, then the possibility of 
receiving bonus points is lost. It is common for an original proponent to submit a 
modified proposal. 
  
The recent policy decisions for PPI projects in Korea have been directed toward 
improving the efficiency of public funds and giving priority to solicited projects, thus 
since early 2005, the following reforms reorganized PICKO into PIMAC, aimed at 
reducing the number of unsolicited projects:  
 
• Mandatory consultation. The review process must include consultations between 
PIMAC and the line agencies or ministries at every stage of the implementation 
procedure. 
  
                                                 
25 PIMAC is the result of a merger between Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (PICKO) of the 
Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements and the Public Investment Management Agency of the 
Korean Development Institute. 
26 Based on US$1=KRW950. Total project cost is the aggregate sum of survey cost, design cost, construction 
cost, compensation cost, incidental cost, operation equipment cost, taxes and charges, and operation reserves. 
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• Introduction of the Value for Money (VFM) Test. Since 2005, the feasibility of 
every project should be reviewed and screened through a VfM test. PIMAC 
published a manual for guiding the test, which is separated into three phases: first, 
a “Decision to Invest” is used to confirm whether a project is worth the social 
benefit; second, a “Decision to Implement by PPP” is carried out to determine 
whether a project is suitable to be implemented by private finance initiative (PFI) 
after comparing it with the public sector comparator (PSC); and third, the 
suitability of a project is determined after analyzing the results of qualitative VfM 
(life-cycle costs of PSC) and quantitative VfM evaluation (level of service 
quality). In addition, projects that are deemed suitable are carried through 
additional financial analysis to calculate the expected amount of government 
subsidy (compensatory portion for construction cost and operation cost).  
 
• Elimination of the minimum revenue guarantee. Previously, minimum operating 
revenue guarantees (MRG) were 80 percent of operating revenue for the first 5 
years of operation, 70 percent during the 6 to 10 years after commencement of 
operations, and 60 percent from years 11 to 15. However, since 2005, these 
guarantees no longer apply.  
THE PHILIPPINES  
 
The energy crisis in the late 1980s, coupled with the impending budget deficit, prompted 
the government of the Philippines to seek private sector support in carrying out national 
priority projects. To enable such involvement, in December 1990, the Philippine 
Congress enacted Asia’s first build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) law, known as Republic 
Act No. 6957.27  
 
The concept of unsolicited proposals in BOT projects was later introduced in Republic 
Act No. 7718 of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), which stipulate 
that unsolicited proposals should 
• Involve a new concept or technology; 
• Not be part of the agency or local government unit’s (LGU) list of priority 
projects, as consolidated under the medium-term public investment program for 
national government agencies; and 
• Not require any direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity.  
In addition, any component of an approved solicited project will not be eligible as an 
unsolicited proposal. 
 
Two key government bodies are currently involved in managing unsolicited proposals in 
the Philippines. The BOT Center,28 as an attached unit to the Department of Trade and 
Industry, is mandated to provide project development assistance and monitoring 
                                                 
27 “An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by 
the Private Sector and for other purposes.” This law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 7718 in April 
1994 to increase private investment in other infrastructure sector among other features. 
28 Before the creation of the BOT Center, the Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program 
(CCPAP) was identified as the agency responsible for the coordination and monitoring of projects 
implemented under the BOT Law, pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. 7718. CCPAP was later reorganized and 
converted into the Coordinating Council for Private Sector Participation (CCPSP), by Administrative Order 
No. 67, series of 1999, as amended by Administrative Order No. 103, series of 2000. Executive Order 144, 
dated November 2002 provided for the conversion of the CCPSP to the current BOT center and transferred as 
an attached unit from the Office of the President to the Department of Trade and Industry. 
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functions in addition to marketing the BOT/PSP program to prospective investors, 
developers, and government agencies. In addition, the Investment Coordination 
Committee (ICC) of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) 
Board29 is mandated to review and approve private sector projects under BOT schemes 
and its variants in the context of investment planning, financing, and monitoring of 
balance-of-payments implications of major national projects.   
 
It is difficult to estimate how many unsolicited proposals were submitted since the 
mechanism was in introduced in 1994 because proposals are first channeled through line 
ministries and local government units. Unsolicited proposals only reach central agencies 
such as the BOT Center and NEDA-ICC Secretariat if they are found to have sufficient 
merit to be sponsored. Table B.3 lists unsolicited proposed projects that have secured a 
contract and are operational as of June 2006. Table B.4 provides information about 
projects under review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 The ICC was created by Executive Order No. 230 of December 1992. The ICC is composed of the Director-
General of the NEDA Secretariat, the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of Finance, Agriculture, Trade and 
Industry, and of Budget and Management, and the Governor of the Central Bank. 
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Table B.3: Unsolicited Projects Presented to BOT Center and ICC Secretariat, 
1994–2006 (operational and awarded) 
Project title 
and Status 
Sponsor 
agency 
Sector Type/ 
variant 
Estimated 
project 
cost 
(millions) 
Year 
approved 
Status Winner Was 
“right 
to 
match” 
a 
factor? 
Under concession/operational  
Alien Certificate 
of Registration 
I-Card Project 
BI Information 
technology 
BOT   
$2.80 
2003 Ongoing Original 
proponent 
No 
Caliraya–
Botocan–
Kalayaan Power 
Plant Project 
NPC Power/water BROT   
$450.00 
n.a. Operational Original 
proponent 
Yes 
Casecnan 
Multipurpose 
BOT Project 
NPC Power/water BOT   
$650.00 
1994 Operational Original 
proponent 
No 
Computerization 
of the Civil 
Registry System 
NSO Information 
technology 
BTO   
$65.00 
1996 Operational Original 
proponent 
No 
San Roque 
Multipurpose 
Project 
NPC, 
NIA, 
DENR, 
DPWH 
Power/water BOT   
$1,141.00 
1996 Operational Original 
proponent 
No 
Subtotal: 5 projects   
$2,308.80 
 
Awarded/under construction 
Land Titling 
Computerization 
Project 
LRA Information 
technology 
BOO   
$82.00 
1998 Ongoing Original 
proponent 
No 
Machine-
Readable 
Passports and 
Visas Project 
DFA Information 
technology 
BOT   
$50.30 
1995 Terminated 
by DFA 
Original 
proponent 
No 
San Pascual 
Cogeneration 
Power Plant 
Project 
NPC Power BOO   
$400.00 
1995 Operational Original 
proponent 
No 
Pampanga GIS 
Center 
Pampanga 
Province 
LGU  
Information 
Technology 
BTO   
$0.96 
n.a. Ongoing Original 
proponent 
No 
Tarlac Public 
Market 
Tarlac 
City LGU  
Property 
development 
BOT   
$3.88 
n.a. Ongoing Original 
proponent 
No 
Roxas 
Commercial 
Center 
Roxas, 
Isabela 
LGU 
Property 
development 
BOT   
$1.00 
n.a. Ongoing Original 
proponent 
No 
Subtotal: 6 projects $538.14  
Ninoy Aquino 
International 
Airport 
Terminal III 
Development 
Project 
Cancelled 
DOTC Transport BOT $369.15 1995 Partially 
completed 
but not in 
operation. 
Contract 
nullified. 
Third 
party 
Yes 
Subtotal: 1 project $369.15  
 
 
Source: BOT Center, NEDA-ICC. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
Sponsor agency: BI = Bureau of Immigration, DENR = Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources, DFA = Department of Foreign Affairs, DOTC = Department of 
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Transportation and Communications, DPWH = Department of Public Works and 
Highways, LGU =local government unit, LRA = Land Registration Authority, NIA = 
National Irrigation Administration, NPC = National Power Corporation, NSO = National 
Statistics Office. 
Type variant: BOT= build-operate-and-transfer; BOO = build-own-and-operate; BROT= 
build-rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer; BTO = build-transfer-and-operate. 
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Table B.4: Unsolicited Projects Presented to BOT Center and ICC Secretariat, 
1994–2006 (under review) 
Project title and Status Sponsor 
agency 
Sector Type/ 
variant 
Estimated 
project 
cost 
(millions) 
Status 
Balara–La Mesa–San Jose del Monte–
Baliwag Toll Road Project (La Mesa 
Parkway, Stage 1) 
DPWH, 
MWSS 
Transport BOT n.a. Under review 
Bulacan Central Bulk Water Supply 
Project 
LWUA Water  BOT    
$29.12  
Second pass 
approval secured 
Bureau of Immigration Government 
Building 
BI Property 
development 
BT/ 
BOO 
n.a.  First pass approval 
secured 
4Caticlan Airport DOTC Transport BOT n.a. Under review 
Extensible Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (XAFIS) 
NBI Information 
technology 
BOT    
$41.56  
Second pass 
approval secured 
Improving the Philippine Postal 
Corporation's Financial and 
Operational State through ICT/E-
commerce Opportunities 
PPC Information 
technology 
BLT    
$61.45  
Second pass 
approval secured 
Laoag Commercial Complex Laoag 
LGU 
Property 
development 
BTO    
$7.30  
Second pass 
approval secured 
Mass Rail Transit Line 7 (MRT 7) DOTC Transport BGTOM    
$1,298.80  
First pass approval 
secured 
Metro Cebu Bulk Water Supply– 
Luyan River in Carmen  
MCWD Water  BOO    
$34.00  
First pass approval 
secured 
Metro Manila Transit Line 4 (MRT 4) DOTC Transport BT/ 
BOO 
   
$958.00  
First pass approval 
secured 
Metro Manila Transit Line 8 East Rail 
Project 
DOTC Transport BT/ 
BOT 
n.a. Under review 
Muntinlupa Skywalk LGU Transport BOT n.a. Under review 
Northern Intermodal Transport 
Terminal Complex 
DOTC Transport BOO    
$17.30  
First pass approval 
secured 
Pasig Expressway Unsolicited BOT 
Proposal 
DPWH Transport BOT    
$700.19  
First pass approval 
secured 
Establishment of a Thermal Coating 
and Printing Plant  
PCSO Property 
development 
BOT  n.a.  Under review 
San Fernando Runway Lights 
Development Project 
PPMA Transport BT    
$0.39  
First pass approval 
secured 
SSS Corporate Center Project SSS Property 
development 
BTO/ 
BOT 
   
$103.52  
First pass approval 
secured 
Legaspi City Water District Supply 
(Legaspi, Daraga, Sorsogon and 
Tabaco Water Districts) 
LCWD Water  BOT   n.a. First pass approval 
secured 
Subtotal: 18 projects    
$3,251.64  
 
 
Source: BOT Center, NEDA-ICC. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
Sponsor agency: BI = Bureau of Immigration; DOTC = Department of Transportation 
and Communications; DPWH = Department of Public Works and Highways; LCWD = 
Legaspi City Water District; LGU = local government union; LWUA =Local Water 
Utilities Administration; MCWD = Metro Cebu Water District; MWSS = Metropolitan 
Waterworks and Sewerage System; NBI = National Bureau of Investigation; PCSO = 
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; PPC = Philippine Postal Corporation; PPMA = 
Poro Point Management Authority; SSS = Social Security System.  
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Type/variant: BGTOM = build-gradually transfer-operate-manage; BLT = build-lease- 
transfer; BOO = build-own-operate; BOT = build-operate-and-transfer; BT = build- 
transfer; BTO = build-transfer-operate. 
 
Based on tables B.3 and B.4, unsolicited proposals totaled 30 projects ($6.47 billion) in 
three categories (a) under concession or operational (5 projects at $2.31 billion), (b) 
awarded or under construction (6 projects at $0.54 billion and 1 cancelled at $0.36 
billion), and (c) under review or in the pipeline (18 projects at $3.25 billion).  
 
The ICC, as the approving authority for BOT proposals, has not rejected any unsolicited 
BOT proposal. Rejections by the implementing agencies, however, if any, are 
undocumented and reporting is not mandatory.  
 
The process for unsolicited proposals in the Philippines has some flaws: 
 
Unrealistic or Unforced Timelines. The private sector investors view the process as 
protracted and counter-productive if the government takes too long to review and 
approve a project. Timelines are especially obstructive for information technology 
projects because these products and services quickly become outdated. For example, 
the Department of Foreign Affair’s machine-readable passport and visa project was 
terminated because the proposed technology was no longer compliant with 
contemporary international standards. However, sometimes the prescribed timelines 
are not sufficient to facilitate compliance, as in the case of lapsed validity of bids and 
first-pass approvals beyond the prescribed 180 days (for example, Carmen Bulk 
Water Supply Project).  
 
Right-to-Match Advantage. In general, unsolicited proposals were awarded to the 
original proponent either as a result of the right to match or due to the absence of 
challenging bids. The possibility of conducting complex technical studies, for 
example, a hydrology risk study or other related feasibility studies, render certain 
projects unattractive to potential challengers given the limited time and high cost to 
prepare a comparative proposal.  
 
Lack of Transparency. The tender for comparative proposals remains the 
responsibility of the agency or LGU. The BOT law and the IRR do not specifically 
require the agency or LGU to submit details of the tender proceedings to any 
oversight authority. As such, detailed information on the challengers and comparative 
proposals on a per project basis is not available, nor is it maintained or documented 
by either the BOT Center or the ICC Secretariat. As a result, there is no evidence of 
effective competition, which limits any possible benefits from third parties submitting 
more attractive bids. 
 
The lessons learned from more than a decade of experience in the administration of 
Philippine BOT projects have resulted in policy changes in the BOT process; 
amendments to the BOT law are also being proposed at the House of Representatives, 
under House Bill 5002. In particular for unsolicited proposals, HB 5002 provides for the 
following revisions: 
 
• A longer period for the preparation of comparative or competitive proposals up to 
120 days; 
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• Removal of new concept or technology as criteria for unsolicited proposal 
eligibility; and, 
• Removal of the right-to-match provision in exchange for reimbursement of the 
actual development costs to the original proponent in the event that the challenger 
outbids the original proponent. 
 
These issues seem to be shared in Taiwan, though it has a shorter history with unsolicited 
proposals. As illustrated below, the use of the right to match in Taiwan has fallen short to 
encourage competitive bids because in the majority of the cases, third parties did not take 
part in the tender process.  
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa has established a firm regulatory framework for national and provincial 
government institutions to enter into public-private partnership (PPP) agreements. The 
central legislation governing PPPs for national and provincial governments is Treasury 
Regulation 16, issued by the Public Finance Management Act in 1999.  
 
The regulation makes no provision for unsolicited bids. The transport sector in South 
Africa is an exception to the national PPP framework. The specific provisions for 
unsolicited proposals management are allowed and administered by the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL), an arms-length agency of the Ministry of 
Transport.  
 
Since the system has been in place, four proposals have been presented to SANRAL, but 
none has yet been publicly tendered. One of the four has been rejected; the other three are 
undergoing the review process.  
 
Table B.5: Status of Unsolicited Proposals to SANRAL, as of March 2006 
Project Value (millions) Status 
N1–N2 Winelands Toll Highway $400 Likely to be publicly tendered in 2006 
N2 Wild Coast Toll Highway $600 Set aside but not rejected as a result of 
the ministerial decision from the 
National Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
R300–Cape Town Ring Road $300 Under review and to be submitted to 
the Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism 
John Ross Highway Project Unknown Abandoned 
Source: SANRAL 
SRI LANKA  
 
The Guidelines on Private Sector Infrastructure Projects30 of the National Procurement 
Agency of Sri Lanka provide the general framework for handling unsolicited proposals. 
As per the Guidelines, line agencies and ministries receiving unsolicited proposals 
process them according to the procedures applicable to solicited proposals.  
 
                                                 
30 See http://www.npa.gov.lk/documents_and_circulars.php.  
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Unsolicited proposals should contain all basic information to ascertain the economic and 
financial viability of the project. Once the need is determined, the relevant line ministry 
should, by advertisement, call for proposals. The party that made the original offer should 
be given a chance to improve it in the invitation for bids and offers if the proposal has 
been significantly changed to suit the needs and objectives of the agency involved. No 
decision should be made solely on the basis of unsolicited offers without inviting 
proposals and bids through public advertisement. 
TAIWAN (CHINA) 
 
In early 2000, Taiwan’s Act for the Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Projects came into force. In March 2002, Taiwan’s Public Construction Commission 
implemented the Guidelines for Evaluation of Unsolicited Proposals by the Arranging 
Authority under the umbrella of Article 46 of the BOT Act, which provides for the 
submission of unsolicited proposals by the private sector for the development of 
infrastructure projects.  
 
The Public Construction Commission (PCC) falls under the authority of the Executive 
Yuan and has overall responsibility for the monitoring and control of all projects under 
the BOT Act including those originating as unsolicited proposals.31 The scope of possible 
projects for private participation—solicited or unsolicited—includes a broad range of 
sectors.32 While the PCC maintains overall responsibility for BOT projects, a specific 
project will by its nature also fall under the authority of other levels of the government.  
 
The planning and coordination of major infrastructure projects, such as energy or 
transportation projects, fall within the responsibility of the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development of the Executive Yuan. Specific project assessment, selection, 
and management, however, will be further delegated to the relevant government 
ministry.33 Local city and county governments will also get involved when a proposed 
project falls within their jurisdiction.  
 
The Guidelines arose from the needs of both the private sector and the government to 
address the administrative and procedural elements for unsolicited proposals.34 The 
private sector had, for the most part, been unwilling to carry the risk of preparing an 
unsolicited proposal; it lobbied for further administrative guidance from the PCC.35 
                                                 
31 The PCC also maintains overall responsibility for administering the Government Procurement Act. 
Infrastructure projects tendered by the central government will be done so pursuant to the Government 
Procurement Act. The BOT Act permits various models for private participation in infrastructure projects: 
build-operate-transfer, build-transfer-operate, rehabilitate-operate-transfer, build-own-operate, operate-transfer, 
or other approved models. State projects must also be published on the PCC’s procurement website. 
32 Eligible sectors include: transportation facilities, common conduit, environmental pollution prevention 
facilities, sewage lines, water supply facilities, hydraulic facilities, sanitation and medical facilities, social welfare 
facilities, labor welfare facilities, cultural and educational facilities, major facilities for tour sites, power facilities, 
public gas and fuel supply utilities, sports facilities, parks facilities, major industrial facilities, major commercial 
facilities, major hi-tech facilities, development of new towns, and agricultural facilities.  
33 Examples include the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
the Environmental Protection Administration, and the Ministry of Interior. 
34 The first unsolicited proposal failed because neither the proponent nor the relevant authorities had any 
direction or guidance on making or assessing the proposal. 
35 Private sector interest was fueled in part by government tax incentives under the BOT Act for private 
participation in infrastructure projects. 
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Before the Guidelines, only one unsolicited proposal was submitted in two years (2000–
2002). However, activity has increased since the Guidelines are in place.  
 
The Guidelines establish two categories of unsolicited proposals: Type 1 projects, in 
which the proponent acquires and provides the land for the project, and Type 2 projects, 
in which the proponent requires the government to acquire or provide the land, facilities, 
or both for the project.  
 
For a Type 1 project, the proponent must submit a detailed proposal. The scope of the 
detailed proposal and required supporting documentation has been defined in Article 46-1 
of the BOT Act. The arranging authority or the relevant competent government entity at 
the request of the arranging authority will evaluate the project based on policy objectives, 
compliance with relevant acts and regulations, the degree of government support required 
for the project, and the overall feasibility of the project. The arranging authority has six 
months to evaluate the proposal, though this period may be extended for an additional six 
months. If the project is approved based on the evaluation of the detailed proposal, then 
the parties move into the project planning phase and sign the concession agreement. 
 
For a Type 2 project, the proponent must submit the project outline for the initial 
evaluation phase. The arranging authority will then publish the details of the proposed 
project within one week of receiving the proposal. The private sector has 15 days to 
present alternative proposals for the use of the government land, facilities, or both 
identified in the initial proposal. The arranging authority then undertakes the initial 
evaluation phase for all proposals received. The arranging authority must also consider 
the additional factors of whether the project would be in the public interest and whether it 
would be the best use of the land or facilities. At the completion of the initial evaluation, 
the arranging authority will either reject the proposal or approve it for further 
consideration. 
 
Once the arranging authority has completed the initial evaluation of a Type 2 project and 
approved the proposal for consideration, the proponent must submit a detailed proposal to 
the arranging authority for the secondary evaluation phase. The arranging authority will 
then form an evaluation committee to assess the detailed proposal. The arranging 
authority has six months to evaluate the proposal, though this may be extended for an 
additional six months. If the project is approved based on the evaluation of the detailed 
proposal, then the parties move to negotiations over the proponent’s intellectual property 
rights in the proposal and the invitation to bid. 
 
Type 2 projects must be open to the private sector for competitive bidding. The 
proponent and the arranging authority will exclusively negotiate the invitation to bid.36 
This negotiation provides the proponent both the opportunity to further develop its 
working relationship with the arranging authority and to tailor its bid to address its 
strengths and overcome its weaknesses. The proponent can also ensure that its intellectual 
property rights in the proposal are adequately protected. The Guidelines also provide the 
proponent with one of two possible advantages: the right to match a superior competitive 
bid or a bonus (expressed as a percentage over which the proponent’s bid can exceed the 
best offer and still be selected).  
                                                 
36 If the parties are unable to negotiate the invitation to bid, then the arranging authority retains the right to 
proceed with the project.  
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Since the Guidelines came into force, 29 unsolicited proposals have gone to competitive 
bidding and had contracts awarded for approximately $3.44 billion,37 which represent 
43.4 percent of the total (solicited and unsolicited) BOT project portfolio (see table B.6). 
The majority of the proposals have been for infrastructure projects in the tourism and 
commercial building sectors. 
 
Table B.6: Proposals Evaluated by the PCC, as of May 2006 
Proposal status Number Percent
Presented 193 
Considered not feasible 142 74
Under review  22 11
Accepted, contract awarded 29 15
 
 
Source: Public Construction Commission, Executive Yuan. 
Note: a. Proposal was either formally rejected or did not proceed far beyond the 
submission of the project outline. 
 
The Guidelines establish that the competitive bidding period shall be 45 days. This time 
limit leaves little opportunity for interested third parties to assess and prepare qualified 
bids. As of May 2006, of the 29 projects that were competitively tendered, third parties 
submitted bids in only one case. In all cases the original proponent was granted the right 
to match and the bonus was not used. Apparently, responsible authorities lack any 
practical guidance on defining and calculating the bonus. There is a degree of uncertainty 
over the bonus that granting the right to match has been viewed as the most practical 
option. The reliance on the right to match has been cited as a concern because it has been 
known to discourage competitive bids (in all cases the contract was awarded to the 
original proponent).  
 
Currently, the central government is considering amendments to the BOT framework to 
address its experiences. Unsolicited proposals have been relatively well received by local 
officials who see this process as a more defined than for standard BOT projects. PPP 
principles, however, still suffer from a lack of understanding and the success of a BOT 
project is often seen as being dependent upon the capabilities of the responsible authority. 
Local officials have the legal right to retain outside consultants to advise on projects, 
however, this practice has not been common.  
 
A major criticism from the foreign business community is the lack of expertise and 
experience in BOT projects locally and the failure to retain outside experts to compensate 
for this shortcoming. Local officials have also been criticized for a somewhat prevalent 
view that PPP shifts all of the costs and risks of a project onto the private sector. Overall, 
experience with BOT projects in Taiwan has tempered foreign participation in unsolicited 
proposals; the majority of proposals have been submitted by local companies. 
                                                 
37 Removing three specific projects (one that was subsequently terminated and two of significant value) the 
overall value of private investment stands at $1.5 billion. 
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UNITED STATES 
 
State of Virginia 
 
The Public-Private Transportation Act of 1995 (PPTA), as amended in October 2005, is 
the legislative framework enabling the Commonwealth of Virginia, local governments, 
and certain other public entities, to enter into agreements authorizing private entities to 
develop and or operate qualifying transportation facilities. 
The PPTA of 1995 allows both solicited and unsolicited project proposals. The major 
steps involved in evaluating, selecting, and implementing the projects are similar for 
solicited and unsolicited proposals. 
 
Proposals are evaluated and implemented according to a six-phase process.  
 
 
Phase 1: Quality control review by Department of Transportation to determine if a    
conceptual proposal meets the requirements of law.  
 
Phase 2: Review, evaluation, and recommendation by an independent review panel of one 
or more conceptual proposals.  
 
Phase 3: Review and concurrence or rejection of the conceptual proposal(s) by the 
appropriate oversight board and a recommendation that the department seek a detailed 
proposal from the proponent(s).  
 
Phase 4: Final selection of the successful detailed proposal(s).  
 
Phase 5:  Negotiation process of a draft interim or comprehensive agreement.  
 
Phase 6: Final stage of review before to the execution of the interim or comprehensive 
agreement by the appropriate department administrator and proponents. 
 
Except for those proposals that require the designation of a coordinating public entity, 
within 30 days of the receipt of an unsolicited proposal, the Department of Transportation 
will initiate a review to determine if the proposal meets all legal and policy requirements.  
 
The department will publish a notice accepting the proposal for evaluation and invite 
others to submit competing proposals. The notice will state that the department has 
received and accepted an unsolicited proposal under the PPTA Act, that it intends to 
evaluate the proposal, that it may negotiate an interim or comprehensive agreement with 
the proponent based on the proposal, and that it will accept any competing and compliant 
proposals for simultaneous consideration. If the proposal is modified or amended, then 
the initial proponent will also be given the opportunity to add information during the 
competing period. Proposals will be posted for at least 90days (provided federal 
oversight, financial participation, or approval are not needed).  
 
The department also reserves the right to treat other proposals received after the original 
proposal as either a competing proposal or a non-competing unsolicited proposal. Within 
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30 days of the close of the competition period for unsolicited proposals, the department 
will review any competing proposals for quality control and determine whether the 
proposal is competing and compliant with applicable laws. All proposals that pass the 
quality control review will be forwarded immediately to the secretary of transportation. 
The secretary of transportation will then have 60 days to appoint and designate a chair for 
an independent review panel (IRP) to evaluate the proposals (composed of senior state 
transportation officials and other individuals who have appropriate expertise). The IRP 
will review the proposals and any comments received from affected jurisdictions or the 
general public, then will make recommendations to the department or public entity’s 
oversight board. The IRP may recommend that the proposal is adequate to begin 
negotiations of an interim or comprehensive agreement. 
 
Following review and recommendations by the IRP, the oversight board will review the 
conceptual proposals and any recommendations of the IRP and will recommend to the 
department of transportation whether to advance to a detailed proposal stage. If 
proceeding, the department will form a proposal review committee to review the 
recommendations of the IRP and the oversight board, and within 45 days, may request 
that none, one, or more proponents submit detailed proposals. Based upon a review of the 
detailed proposals, the department may select none, one, or more proposals for 
competitive negotiations. The department will have 60 days to review the proposals. If 
the department, upon receipt and review of the detailed proposal, determines that the 
proposal meets the selection criteria established for evaluation of the detailed proposal 
and that initiation of the negotiation stage will be in the public interest, then the 
department may initiate the negotiation stage. 
 
Territory of Guam 
 
The Build-Operate-Transfer Implementing Rules and Regulations (Public Law 24-294 
Bill No. 717) allow the Guam Waterworks Authority (GWA) to accept unsolicited 
proposals on a negotiated basis provided that all of the following conditions are met: 
• Projects involve a new concept and technology and are not part of the current 
list of priority projects of the agency; 
• No direct government guarantee, subsidy, or equity is required; and 
• GWA has invited—by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and 
by other international media—comparative or competitive proposals, and no 
other proposal is received for 60 working days. If another proponent submits a 
lower-priced proposal, then the original proponent has the right to match that 
price within 30 working days. 
The BOT committee will evaluate all unsolicited proposals to ensure technical and 
financial merit within 90 days of receipt. If the committee finds that the unsolicited 
proposal has merit, then it will submit its recommendations and the proposal to the board 
of directors for disposition. When another proponent submits a lower-priced proposal 
following publication by GWA and the original proponent matches that price within 30 
working days, then the BOT committee will identify which proposal has greater technical 
merit and submit its recommendations and the proposals to the board of directors for 
disposition. 
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APPENDIX C   
LINKS TO LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
 
Argentina 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/105000-109999/108805/norma.htm 
 
Australia, New South Wales 
http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/wwg/pdf/wwgguidelines.pdf 
 
Australia, Queensland 
http://www.coordinatorgeneral.qld.gov.au/pp_partnerships/policy_guidance.shtm 
 
Australia, Victoria 
http://www.partnerships.vic.gov.au/CA25708500035EB6/WebObj/PVGuidanceMaterial_
PracGuide/$File/PVGuidanceMaterial_PracGuide.pdf 
 
Canada, British Columbia 
http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/pt/dmb/cpf.shtml 
 
Canada, Ontario 
http://www.pir.gov.on.ca/userfiles/HTML/cma_4_35661_1.html 
 
Chile 
http://www.mop.cl/documentos/ley_cgc.pdf 
 
Costa Rica 
http://www.mopt.go.cr/cnc/decreto.html 
 
India, Andhra Pradesh 
http://www.apidc.org/Infraact.pdf 
 
India, Gujarat 
http://www.gidb.org 
 
Indonesia 
http://www.kkppi.go.id/laws/PerPres67.pdf 
 
Republic of Korea 
http://www.mpb.go.kr/english.html 
 
The Philippines 
www.botcenter.gov.ph/botlaw/index.htm 
 
South Africa 
http://www.nra.co.za/usb_policy.pdf 
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Sri Lanka 
http://www.boi.lk 
 
Taiwan (China) 
http://www.pcc.gov.tw/eng/indexE.htm 
 
United States, Guam (Territory) 
http://www.guamlegislature.com/24th_Guam_Legislature/Public_Laws_24th/PL240294.
htm 
United States, Virginia (State of)  
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+TOC56000000022000000000000 
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